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Abstract : In this paper we consider a model for redistribution of risk by means of
minsurance contracts as well as financial assets. The trade of reinsurance contracts is
~-onstraim~d I,y th~~ prohihitiou of overinsurxnce. We show how this market fits into the
franu~work of au iucou,ph~ti~ iuarket witli tradiug coiistraints. Nluthcrmorc, it is shown
tliat tlie iiitroduction of trading constraints may allow for limited arbitrage possibilities
at equilibrium. Therefore, equilibrium prices are not necessarily no-arbitrage prices.
Keywords : optimal reinsurance, incomplete markets, trading constraints, arbitrage
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1. Introduction
It is well known that in general, insurance agents will rediatribute the insured risks
amongst each other by means of reinsurance contracts. In doing so, they try to optimíze
their ri~k poaition, given the prices of reinsurance. Vaguely atated (we will be more
precise iu the sequel), this means that each of the agenta has a certain rule to decide
whether he prefers a risk position to another riak poeition. According to this rule, he
will choose his "optimal" risk position.
Riiles which are used quite often to "choose" between risk positions are based on
actuarial calculationa. This means that several stochastic characteristica of a risk, auch
as its mean and variance, are calculated. Prices are then calculated uaing well known
actuarial pricing principlea. Given the prices for (re)insurance and the atochastic char-
acteristics of the insured risks, the agent has to decide upon reinsurance.
In [DD~, the authors show how, for stop loss reinsurance contracts, these rules can
be refineci using conditional expectation and conditional variance of the residual risk.
The residual risk is defined as the insured risk reduced by the reinsured risk. Indeed,
stocha.gtic calculus can be used to determine, at each given date, the conditional ex-
pected value and the conditional variance of the residual risk for a proportional stop
loss reinsiuance portfolio. Expected value and variance are calculated conditional to
the information that the agent has about the claim height process at that time. These
rules allow for a continuous adjustment of the reinsurance portfolio.
A criticism on these kind ofrules however is that they are only based on the stochastic
characteristics of the insured risks, and therefore don't keep track of the surrounding
market conditions such as the possibilities on the financial markets. It ia clear however,
that financial markets are very important for insurers and reinsurers, because they
provide a means to invest premiums. Therefore, it would be intereating to build a
model for optimal reinsurance where these market conditions, as well as the atochastic
characteristics of the risks, can play a role in determining redistributions of risks and
prices for reinsurance of risks. In such a model, agents will construct a financial portfolio
and a risk portfolio ((re)insurances) according to their own preferences. Of course, these
"optimalr choices will depend on the prices of the financial assets and the (re)insurance
contracts that can be traded. Now the question is whether prices for financial assets
and (re)insurance contracts can be found such that this behaviour of the agenta leads
to an equilibrium, i.e, the net trade of contracts equals 2ero.
If we formiilate it like this, it becomes clear that the problem fits into the framework
of General Equilibrium Theory, or shortly G.E. theory. Indeed, G.E. theory ia eape-
cially concerned with the problem of the existence of equilibrium prices and equilibrium
allocations of goods, under the assumption that thé agenta each use a certain rule to
determine their optimal position, given the prices of the goods.a
In [Bo], one finds a very cleaz explanation of how G.E. theory can be applied to the
(re)insurance markets. This leads to very nice results about the structure of equilibrium
prices for (re)insurance and the Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations of risk.
These results are obtained under the assumption that markets are complete, i.e. every
possible risk can be insured for a certain price. Fïuthermore, prices are concidered to
be linear functionals of the risks, which are represented by stochastic variables. It is
our sim in this paper to study a model where markets are potentially incomplete and
prices are not necessarily linear functionals of the riaks. The reasons we are interested
in this case am the following :
~ since (re)insurance contracts are often standardized, it seems reasonable to assume
that (re)insurance markets might be incomplete, i.e. not every possible combination
of risks cazi be insttred.
~ on the other hand, recent developments in the theory of incomplete markets have
made clear that, if the trade on a certain market is constrained, equilibrium prices
need not necessarily be linear functionals (see for instance [DW]). Now since the trade
on (re)insurance mazkets is constrained by the prohibition of overinsurance, it seems
t}tat we have to be carefitl in assuming that equilibrium prices are linear functionals.
The model we aze going to describe in this paper can be seen as an extension to
an incomplete mazkets framework of models previously presented by H. Buhhnann
([Bul],[Bu2]). In these papers, the author used G.E. theory to determine an opti-
mal redistribution of risks and corresponding prices for reinsurance. Since this idea is
fundamental to our model, we will now briefly explain it.
Insurance clearly takes place in a world of uncertainty. Indeed, premiums are de-
terministic, but the payoff of claim heights is stochastic. In a two period setting, this
uncertainty could be described by the fact that there are a certain number of different
states of the world that can occur at a following date. We will denote s for a state of
the world ancl 12 for the set of all possible statea of the world. An agent does not know
for sure which atate of the world will occur, but he knows that his payoff at that date
will depend on the state the world will be in at that time. For example in state s E 12
an insured house burns down, whereas in state s' E S2 it doesn't burn down. A risk is
therefore described by a stochastic variable
X:S1~IR.
Each agent i E{ 1, 2, ..., I} has a preference relation }' on risks. Following G.E. theory,
a criterion to decide upon reinsurance would be such that, given the prices for reinsur-
ance, each agent would reinsure in order to obtain the risk position that maximizes his
utility, according to his own preference relation. A question which arises then naturally
is whether prices for reinsurance can be found such that these optimization processes
lead to market clearing in risks. Such prices are called equilibrium prices. The pric-3
ing principle leading to these prices is called an economic premium principle (as
opposed to an actuarial premium principle).
In 1980 and later on in 1984, Buhlmann ([Bul],[Bu2]) used G.E. theory, more speci-
fically the Walrasian equilibrium concept of a pure exchange economy, to obtain an
econonuc prenvum principle. More precisely, he proves that equilibrium prices for rein-
surance exist for arbitrary risk averse von Neumann - Morgenstern utility functions~.
The original risk (before reinsurance) of an agent i is denoted by a stochastic variable
X' : S2 --. IR. So X'(s) denotes the claim height to be paid by the agent if state s
occurs at date one. Redistribution of risks goes by means of the trading of reinsurance
contracts Z: St -r 1R. By reinsuring Z: 52 -i lR, agent i can transform his original risk
X' into a new risk Y (after reinsurance) given by
Y-X'-Z.
In [Bul] and [Bu2], the price of reinsuring Z : Sl -~ IR is considered to be a linear
fimctional of the form :
P~[Z] - J
~ Z(s)~(s)dP(s).
Here P is a given probability measure on SZ, and ~ is called the price density. Let
w' : S2 -~ IR denote the initial wealth of agent i. Then before reinsurance, the date one
wealth of an agent would be the stochastic variable w` - X` : S2 -i IR. If the agent buys
reinsurance Z: S2 ~ IR, then his date one wealth would be the stochastic variable
w'-X'~Z-P~[Z]:52-~1R.
Each agent has a von Neumann - Morgenstern utility on date one wealth variables, i.e.
there exist utility fitnctions u' : 1(t -~ ~f such that for risks X,Y : Sl -~ IR, one has
X r' Y a EP[u'(X)] ~ Ep[u'(Y)].
Now the idea of G.E. theory is that each agent will choose reinsurance Z in order to
maximize the utility of his date one wealth. An equilibrium price density ~ is a price




ii) ~ }" - ~ X' a.s.
~-i t-i
(1)
~ see for instauce [De].4
Equation i) expresses that each agent chooses reinsurance Z- X' -Y in order to obtain
a clate one wealth which maximizes his utility. Equation ii) expresses that these optimal
choices must lead to market clearing. The proof of existence of a solution of (1), i.e. of
the existence of an c~quilibrium price density, is established in [Bu2] for arbitrary risk
averse utility functions u', i E{ 1, 2, .. . , I}. Fltrthermore in this same paper, a link is
made between the equilibrium price density ~ and an exponentíal premium calculation
principle.
Some remarks can be made about condition i) in (1) :
~ any agent is allowed to reinsure any risk or combination of riaks. Indeed, aince
Y is the risk after reinsurance, and since there is no constraint on Y(any
Y: S2 -~ IR is allowed), this impliea that any reinsurance contract
Z-X'-Y:S2~1R
can be traded. This basically means that one considers the insurance mazket to
be a complete markett. In general however, we see that reinsurance contracts
are often standarclized to be either proportional, excess of loss, stop loss, .... or
combination.g of these2. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that reinsurance
tnarkets are rather (at least potentially) incomplete,
~ the fact that the system of equations (1) describes a complete markets model,
implies that overinsurance is allowed. Indeed, agents aze allowed to buy rein-
surance Z such that in some state s E S2 they have Z(s) 1 X`(s). Now suppose
that this state s is the state in which an insured house burns down, then the
overinsitred agent has an incentive to put the house on fire. Indeed, if he does so,
he will have a sure gain of Z(s) - X;(s) units of account. Therefore, the possi-
bility of overinsurance is prohibited by law. This makes it especially interesting
for us to study the exchange of risks under this constraint,
~ prices are considered to be linear functionals,
~ there is essentially only one time period, i.e. prices are paid when risks occur.
Therefore, the aim in this paper is to extend Buhlmann's model to a general equilib-
rium model for the reinsurance market where
~ insurance markets are treated as being (potentially) incomplete markets,
~ the trade on insurance markets is constrained by institutional rules such as for
instance the prohibition of overinsurance,
~ prices are not necessarily linear functionals,
t For a definition of complete and incomplete markets, see for instance [MS].
~ For definitions and information about reinsurance contracts, see for instance
[BG] or [GdV).5
~ financial markets aze included in the model,
~ there are two time perioda, at time zero pricea for (re)insurance and financial
assets are paid, at date one risks occur and assets pay off.
We w~ill proceed in the following way : in section two, we will motivate why a gen-
eral equilibrium model for a reinsurance market should be different from a general
equilibrium model for a financial market. We will come to the conclusion that the
right framework for reinsurance markets is the one for incomplete markets with trading
constraints. Therefore, in section three, we will give a brief description of a general
incomplete markets model with trading constraints. We will show that the introduction
of trading constraints can have drastic effects on the structure of the equilibrium prices.
An example will make clear that the no-arbitrage principle can be violated in equilib-
rium. In section four we will treat the reinsurance markets. We will consider a market
where reinsruance contracts as well as fmancial assets can be traded. We show how this
market fits into the framework of incomplete markets with trading constraints. We will
prove that equilibria exist, and we study the structure of the equilibrium prices.
2. Insurance markets versus financial markets
From the mathematical point of view, there is no real difference between a(re)insurance
contract and any other fmancial asset such as for instance equity of a firm. Indeed, both
have a deterministic price, and a stochastic payoff at a later date. So they both are
fully described by
a a raudom variable A : St ~ IIi, where S2 is the state space. For each state s E S2,
A(s) denotes the payoff of the asset or (re}insurance contract at date one if the
market is in state s.
~ a price q E IR to be paid at date zero.
The difference lies in the way they aze traded. Suppose for example that a certain
agent (called agent 1) insures a certain house against fire. Then every insurance agent is
allowed to write a(re)insurance contract on that house, but agent 1 is the only agent who
is allowed to buy such a contract. For financial assets, every agent is allowed to buy every
asset written by the other agents. This example indicates that there is a basic difference
between the trade of (re)insurance contracts on the one hand and financial asseta on
the other hanci. It makes clear that the trade on (re)insurance mazkets is constrained
by very specific rules which do not apply for arbitrazy financial mazkets. Therefore, it
seems natural to apply General Equilibrium Theory for Incomplete Financial Markefa
(G.E.L) to the (re)insurance mazket, keeping in mind of course the specific rules which
determine activity on (re)insurance mazkets. The appropriate model therefore is a
model for incomplete markets with trading constraints. In the next section, we will give
a brief description of such a model.6
3. Incomplete markets with trading constraánts
We start with some notation. There are two time periods, called zero and one. At
date one, the world can be in S different states. So the atate space 12 is considered to
be finite, and will be denoted S2 -{ 1, 2, ..., S}. There are L goods that ca.n be traded
on each of the S f 1 spot markets (one at date zero, and one in each of the S possible
states at date one). Goods are indexed by l E { 1, 2, ..., L}. Good number one will be
denoted the unit of account. The total number of agents on the market is I. Agents
are indexed by i E{ 1, 2, ..., I}. The wealth of an agent can be described by a vector
(xo,xl) E IR(sf~)L, where xl -(x~,xZ,...,xs) E IRsL and for each s E{0,1,...,5},
x, is a column vector (x, ~, x, z, ..., x,,~ )~ with
~ xo,~ - the amount of good 1 for consumption at date zem,
~ x,,~, s E{ 1, 2, . .., S} - the amount of good 1 for consumption at date one if the
market will be in state s.
The vector (xo, xl ) will be called a conaumption bundle. Let w' -(wó, wi, ..., ws)' E
~(sti)t denote the initial endowment of agent i(this is his wealth before trading).
Furthermore, J assets can be traded (some of the assets could for instance be
(re)insurance contracts). Assets will be indexed by j E{1, 2, ..., J}. At date zero,
assets are traded and prices are paid. At date one, assets pay off. Asset j E{1, 2, ..., J}
pmmises to deliver A,; units of account if state s occurs at date one for s E{ 1, 2, . .., S}.
For each asset j E{1, 2, ..., J}, we denote q~ for it's price. Prices are paid in unita of
account. Let q-(q~ , q~, ..., q~) E IR~ x ~ denote the row vector containing the prices of
the J assets. Let A denote the S x J matrix with elements A,;, s E{1, 2, .. ., S}, j E
{ 1, 2, . .., J}. Spot prices will be denoted p,,~, s E{0,1, . .., S}, ! E {1, 2, ..., L}. We
will denote p, for the mw vector (p,,i, pa,s, .-.,P,,t,) E IR~. Furthermore, we denote
P' x - (Poxo,Pix~,...,Psxs)~.
Through the trading of assets, agents can obtain new consumption bundles. Indeed,
suppose an agent i E{ 1, 2, . .. , I} constructs a portfolio z' -(zi , zzi . .., zj)~ E 1R~.
Here x~ is the amount of asset j bought (or sold if negative) by agent i. The price
to be paid at date zero (or to be received if negative) for this portfolio is thus given
by qz -~~ , q;z;. The result of constructing such a portfolio is that the initial
consumption bundle w' of the agent can be transformed into any consumption bundle
x', satisfying:
Poxó - Powó - J x~' ~;-i 9i ~ (2)
p,x; - p,w; f~~ 1 A,;z~ for all s E{1,2,...,S}.
Each agent has a preference relation r` on consumption bundles. Agents will trade on
spot ancl asset markets in order to maximize their utility.7
In general, for financial mazkets, one assumes that every portfolio is tradable by every
agent, and that the consumption sets are equal to IR~t~~~, i.e. the budget sets are
given by
B~(P,q,A)- jxElRtsti)~I3zE1RJ:psx'-P~`w~-F~Á~z}. (3)
In a mocíel with trading eonstraints however, one assumes that the tr` ade on spot mazkets
as well as on asset markets can be constrained by for instance institutional rules. Mathe-
matically, these constraints aze expressed by the fact that for each agent i E{1, 2, ..., I},
there exists a subset Z' of IR~ such that agent t is only allowed to make trades within
this set. So in the case of reinsurance, the sets Z' will express that overinsurance is pro-
hibited. Furthermore, only consumption bundles in the consumption set X` C IR~sf~~~
are allowed.
In the remainder of this section, we will give the definition of an equilibrium price
system for the assets in an incomplete mazkets model with trading constraints. Further-
more, we will try to make clear that the mathematical structure of the trade sets Z' can
have a big influence on the properties of the equilibrium prices. This should motivate
our specific interest to (re)insurance markets (Z' C IFl~) as opposed to financial markets
(Z~ - ~~).
Deflnition 3.1 : For each agent i E{1, 2, . .., I} the óudget set is defined 6y :
B~(P,9,A,Z~)-5(x,z)EX'xZ'I prx`-P~`w~f~AJz1. (4)
Deflnition 3.2 : A system of spot prices p E IR~f~~~ and asset prices
{q~ : j E{1, 2, ... , J}} is an equilibrium price system if and onIy if there exist
i E X', i E {1, 2, ..., I}, and i E Z', á E{1, 2, ..., I}, satisfying the following four
conditions :
L) (x~, z~) E B~(P, 4, A, Z~),
ii) i' r' y for all (y,v) E B'(p,q,A,Z'),
I I
iii) ~ i` - ~ w',
~
iv) ~ i' - 0.
~-i
(5)
The cornesponding allocation {i' : i E{ 1,2, ..., I}} will be called an equilibrium alloca-
tion.8
Deflnition 3.3 : Denote w-(w~,w~,...,w~),Z -(Z~,ZZ,...,Z~), and
X-(X~,X~,...,X~). We define the equilibrium cornspondence T which associates
with each set of market characterietics (w, A, X, Z) the set of equilibrium prices corre-
sponding to these initial endowmente, matrix of asset payoffa, eonsumption sets, and
trading constraints, i.e.
ï(w, A, X, Z) - {(p, q) E 1R~ frkL x IR~ ~ there exist (i, z) E ~;-r B'(p, q, A, Z`) such
that (p,q,i,z) satisfy (5)}.
Now the question is whether 7(w, A, X, Z) is non empty. We will therefore give
strf}ïcie.nt conditions on w, A, X and Z in order to guarantee that
7(w, A, X, Z) ~ 0.
Notation: for an arbitrary convex subset Z C!R~ containing zero, we denote AS(Z)
for the asymptotic cone of Z, i.e.
AS(Z):-{zEZ ~`dtE1R~:tzE2}
Ftrrthermom, we denote int(X) for the interior of a set X and Ker(A) for the null space
of a matrix A.
Assumptions :
A~ ) prefPrence relations }', i E {1, 2, ..., I} are continuous, convex and strictly
monotone (see [De] or [HK]).
AZ) constunption sets X' are closed, convex subsets of IR~S}rk~ which are bounded
from below and satisfy X' -1- ~~t~k~ - X'.
A3) w' E int(X').
A4) trade sets Z' satisfy
A41) Z' is a closed and convex subset of 1RJ,
A4Z) 0 E Z',
A43) 0 E int(~~ r Z').
AS) Ker(A) fl AS(Z') -{0} for all i E{1,2,...,I}.
Theorem 3.1 : If asaumptions Ar ~ AS arefulfilled, then equilibrium prices exist, i.e.
3(p, q) E 7(w, A, X, Z).
Proof : see [DW].9
Theorem 3.1 tells tus that under the above a5sumptions At ~ A5, equilibrium prices
and allocations exist. As opposed to the situation on financial markets without trading
constraints, the properties of these equilibrium prices with respect to arbitrage possibi-
lities are not a priori clear. By giving an example we will pmve that, as a result of the
iutroclurl.iuu of Lru~ lllly, 1'1111Htra111(.H (HIIPII aH flq' InHtallfP thP 1)r11I11111t1O11 n{OVPI'111A11PRnfP
ou riskH), the no-arbitragP principle can be violated.
Example : We collsider an economy with two agents, three assets, one good, two time
periods, aud four pc~sible states at date one. The matrix of asset returns A is given by
1 0 1
1 1 1
`4- 1 1 0 ~
1 1 0
The trade sets of the agents are given by :
Z'-1Rx]-oo,2]2 i-1,2.
CouHluuptiou HPtH Xt and X~ arP Pqual to lftt.
The initial endowmPnt of agent 1 is equal to
(wó, w~ , w2, w3i wá)-(5.5, 5, 4.5, 4, 4).
The initial endowment of agent 2 is equal to
(Il~o , qa~, c~~~ , la3, taa ) -(11.5, 12, 12.5, la, 13).
The utility funetion of the agents are of the form :
ul(~)-n Tof xl-f- ~2f-h
~sf~a,
2
u~(x) - yo -~ c xl f d I z2 t xa i-
x4
~ ` 2
Since there is only one good, spot prices p,,l, s- 1, 2, 3, 4, can be taken to be equal to
one. So the problem we have to solve is whether there exist prices q~, q2 and Q3 such
that there exist (i, i) E B'(q, A, Z') satisfying
i) z' E argmax u'(x)
(s,z)EB~(q,A,Z~)
ii) it f i~ - wt f w2,10
whi~rc~
( x w' z
B`(q,A,Z`)-((x,z)EIRStxZ'Ix,ow;f(Az),
s-1,2,3,4}~
This is equivalent to the following problejn : do there exiat state prices ~r, E IR, s-
1, 2, 3, 4 such that there exist i' E B'(~r, A, Z') satisfying :
i) i' E argmax u'(x)
zEB~(x,A,2~)
ii) i~ f i~ - wl ~ w~,
wherc ~ro - 1 and for i- 1, 2,
B'(a,A,Z')- xEIRs~
~rx - aw'
x~-x~ GwZ-wj } 2
x2 - x3 G w2 - w3 f Z ~
x3-x4-w3-w4
Using the technique of Lagrange multipliers (see for instance [Lu]), we see quite easily
that for n- 8, b- 4, c- 8, d- 2, a-(1, 2, -1,1,1) is an equilibrium price system with
correaponding equilibrium allocations á~ -(16,1,1,1,1) and zZ -(i,16,16,16,16).
Fhrthermore, it is cleac that z-(-á, 4, 4) E Z1 fl Z2 is an arbitrage possibility.








So in this example, we clearly have an equilibrium price system which violates the
no arbitrage principle and therefore, there does not exist a set of strictly positive atate
prices n E 1R~t such that q- ~rA.
Other examples (see [DW]) show that, even in the case where asset returns are
positive, we cannot a priori say that equilibrium asset prices will be atrictly positive.
This will depend on the structure of the trade sets. Yet, in some cases, we can prove
that all equilibrium prices for assets with positive payoff (and strictly positive in at11
least one state) are strictly positive. In the next theorem, we will give an example of
a structure of trade sets which yields atrictly positive equilibrium prices. This result
will be important if we want to apply this theory to (re)insurance markets, because
we will see that the trading constraints on (re)insurance markets are of this particular
structure.
Theorem 3.2 : Suppoae that trade aeta are intervala in IR~, interaected urith a convez
aubact Y` of 1R~ aatiafying
Y' f IR~ - Y', (6)
i. e. for each agent i E{1, 2, ..., I} there eziata a aet Y' aatiafying ((i) and J intervala




Then for each aaaet j E{ 1, 2, .. ., J} vrith Ái E 1Rf`{0}, every equilibrium price q~ ia
atrictly poaitive.
Proof : see [DW~
For more information about arbitrage possibilities, properties of equilibrium prices
and optitnality of equilibria in incomplete markets with trading constraints, see for
instance [DW~.
In the remainder of this paper we will show how the previous results can be used to
prove the existence of an optimal redistribution of risk under constraints. Elirthermore,
we will deduce some properties of the equilibrium reinsurance prices.
4. The reinsurance market
4.1 The maxket model
In this section, we will show how the reinsurance market fits into the incomplete
markets framework described in the previous section.
We consider an insurance market where I(? 2) agents are present. Some ofthe agents
are insurers, indexed by i E Z~ 0, the others are financial agents, indexed by i E.F. It
is clear that, in deciding how risks should be redistributed, financial markets can play
a very important role. Indeed, they provide a means to invest premiums. Fhrthermore,
they allow the agents to use strategies such as cash 9ow matching. Therefore, it seems12
very appropriate to consider a model where the redistribution of risks is combined with
the possibility of asset trading. At time zero, risk can be rediatributed (by means of
reinsurance contracts) and financial asseta can be traded. At time one risks will occur
(so agents will have to pay claim heights) and assets will pay off. Both reinsurance
contracts and assets pay off in units of account. We denote K for the number of assets,
and J for the number of risks to be redistributed.
Notation : Let R denote the Sx J matrix ofexisting risks. So, for each s E{ 1, 2, .. ., S}
and for eac.h j E{ 1, 2, . .., J}, R,~ E IR~ denotes the claim height to be paid for risk j
in state s. Furthermore, for each insurer i E Z and each risk j E{1, 2, ..., J}, we denote
c~ for the fraction of that risk carried by that insurer (before redistribution takes place).
Clearly for all j E{ 1, 2, ..., J} and for all i E Z, we have c'~ E~0,1]. Furthermore,
~c'~-lforall j E {1,2,...,J}.
iEi
Let C denote the S x K matrix of financial assets. So, for each s E{1, 2, .. ., S} and for
each k E{ 1, 2, ..., K}, asset k promisses the delivery of C,k units of account in state s.
Finally, we will cíenote A for the S x (K -F J) matrix where the firat K columns are
financial assets, and the last J columns are risks.
Deflnition 4.1 : The endowment of an insurer i E Z consista of a vector
(wi ~ bi) E~(sfi)t x IR~ x IRK. , ,
The endowment of a financial agent i E .~ consists of a vector
(w' 6') E 1R(sfi)t x 1RK. ,
In both eases :
a wi -(tiwo, w}, ... , w,is)~ E IR(s}t)L denotes the endowment in the L goods in each
of the S f 1 states.
a for insunrs, ci -(c~ , c~, ..., cj)~ E ~i~ denotes the endowment in risks.
~ bi -(6~ , bz, .. ., 6K) E lRK denotes the endowment in assets.
Since good one is the unit of account, and assets pay off in units of account, this implies
that the net endowment in goods for each insurer i E Z is given by :
w;,~ - w;,i f ~tc Cskbk - ~~~ R,~c'~ `ds E {1,2, . . . , S}
w',~ - w;~ `ds E {0,1,...,5},l ~ 1.13
For financial agents i E.~ the net endowment is given by :
w;.~
(~x
- ws,l } Lk-1 CakÓk d9 E {1, `i, . . . , S}
- w' `dsE {0,1,...,S},1~1. ,,~
The problem now is to search for a redistribution of risks and assets in such a way
that each agent i E{1, 2, ..., I} obtains a consumption bundle that maximizes hia utility
(according to his personal preference relation ~'). Portfolios traded by the agents will
be denoted ~o~, where
~ z-(z~ , zzi ..., zK) E 1RK denotes the number of assets bought (or sold).
~ v-(v~, vzi ..., v~) E IR~ denotes the number of reinsurance contracts bought
(or sold).
The trading of risk is restricted by a very important condition, namely the prohibition
of overinsurance. Flrrthermore, riks are redistributed amongst insurance agents only.
Financial agents are not allowed to trade reinsurance contracts. This leads to the
following dcfirrition :
Definition 4.2 :We define the tmde set of an insurnnce agent i E Z as follows :
r
Z' - 1RK x ~] - oo,c'~].
i-r
We define the trade set of an financial agent i E ,~ as follows :
Z' - !RK X {0} ~.
Consumption sets X', i E{1, 2, . .., I} are equal to JJf2~str
)L
The interpretation is as foUows :
~ z E IRk implies that agent i is allowed to sell and buy assets without restric-
tions.
~ for insurers, v~ G c'~ for j E{1, 2, ... , J} implies that agent i is allowed to
reinsure part of (and maximum all of) the riak that he initially insured (no
overinsurance allowed). For financial agents, v~ - 0 implies that they are not
allowed to trade reinsurance.
Assumptions :
A~ ) the preference relations of the agents are continuous, strictly monotone and
convex (see for instance [De] or [HK]).A~ ) the initial endowments of the agents i E{ 1, 2, . ..,1} satisfy w' E IRtt~~t
A3 ) there is no redundancy in the financial asseta C~, j E { 1, 2, ..., J}.
.4,) ~C~n~R~-{0}.
AS) R~ E IRt `{0},j E{1,2,...,J}
Remarks :
~ It is clear that assumption A~ can be made whithout loss of generality. Indeed,
since there are no constraints on the trade of financial assets, the problem can
always be written such that Á3 ia satisfied.
~ assumption A4 says that there is no linear dependence between financial assets
and risks.
The sim now is to prove that, under these assumptions, the structure of the matrix
of asset returns and the trade sets allows for the existence of equilibria. Therefore, as
was shown in section 3, it suffices to show that they satisfy assumptions A~ -. AS of
section 3.
Lemma 4.1 : Under assumptions Ai -i As, the matriz of asset returns A, the trnde sets
Z', i E{1,2, . .., I} and the consumption sets X', i E{ 1, 2, ..., I} satisfy assumptions
A~ ~ As.
Proof : A~,Az, and A3 are clear.
A4 followa from the fact that
t1j E {1,2,...,J} : ~c~ - 1,
iEi
attd
Vj E{1,2,...,J} ,`di E Z: c~ E[0,1].
We will now show that AS is satisfied :
For each insurer i E Z we have
AS(Z') - IRK X IR~.
Now suppose that ~~~ E Ker(A) n AS(Z'). By assumption Á~, this implies that Cz - 0
and Rv - 0. From assumption A3 it then follows that z- 0. Now since v~ G 0 for all
j E{ 1, 2, ..., J} it follows from AS that R,~v~ - 0 for all states s E{ 1, 2, ..., S} and for
all contracts j E{1, 2, . .., J}. Now AS implies that for each contract j E {1, 2, . .., J},15
there is at least one state s E{ 1, 2, ..., S} such that R,~ ~ 0. Therefore, it follows that
v-0.
For financial agents i E f, the idea is analogous.
Theorem 4.1 : Under aaaumptiona A~ -. .44i thc reinaurance market can reach an
equilibrium price and an equilibrium allocation, i.e.
T(w, A, X, Z) ~ 0.
Proof : Trivial consequence of lemma 4.1 and theorem 3.1.
5. Properties of equilibrium prices
In this section we will deduce some properties of these equilibrium prices. First we
prove that all equilibrium prices for reinsurance contracts are strictly positive. Let us
denote p for spot prices, q E IiiK for asset prices, and ry E IRJ for prices of reinsurance.
Theorem 5.1 :
tJ(p,q,ry)E 7(w,A,X,Z),`dj E{1,2,...,J} : y~ 1 0.
Proof : It is easy to see that for each agent i E{1, 2, ... , I}, there e~st K f J intervals




Therefore, we can apply theorem 3.2, which gives the desired
Lemma 5.1 : A ayatem of inequalitiea
r Ïk(z) ~ 0




haa a aolution z that aatufiea fk(z) ~ 0 for some k E{1,2,...,K}, if and only if there
doea not exiat (~, ~) E ~t~ x 1Rt auch ihat
K L
~ ~kJ k f ~ ~191 - ~.
k-1 !-1ls
Proof : Is a slight modification of a proof by K. F'an ([Fá]).
Theorem 5.2 : Thc aet of equilibrissm pricea eatufiea
7(w, A,X,Z) C(p,q,ry) 3A E IRf~ : qt -(~A)k Nk E{1,2,...,K}
y~ C (xA)ifK dj E {1,2,...,J} }.
Proof : Clearly for each insurer i E Z we have
AS(Z~) - ~K x ~~,
and for each financial agent i E F, we have
AS(Z`) - ~tK x {0}~.
Now we know that (see for instance [DW])
r(w,A,X,Z) C 5 (P,9,7)Ib~z E ~U~ AS(Z') : (-(~7)1 (vl ~ ~}ti `{0} ).
We will denote
Q-{ 9 E IRS b'z E~Ul AS(Z') : (-(~ry)1 (vl ~ IR}t' `{0}l.
Now we define two systems of inequalitíes
and
b's E {1,2,...,5} (S~)
9s(z) - -v~ ~ 0 !1j E {1,2,...,J}
Ío(z) - -(q (,1')~~~ ? 0
fe(z) - (A1o~)s ~ ~
rfo(z) - -(q,7)ío) ? 0
( f,(z) - (A(~)), ? 0 `ds E {1,2,...,5}
l g,(z) - v~ - 0 dj E{1,2,...,J}
(SZ)
Then q~ Q if and only if one of the systems of inequalities Sl or Sz has a solution
satisfying
3s E{0,1,... , S} : f,(z) ~ 0. (7)17
But clearly, this is equivalent to the statement that Si has a solution satisfying (7).
By lemma 5.1, this is equivalent to the atatement that there does not exist a vector
(x,a) -(xo,xi,...,~s,ai,az,...,~~) E 1Rt~1 x IRf with
xoqt - (xiA)t dk E {1,2,...,K}
xo7j - (xiA)jtK - ~j Vj E {1, 2, .. . , J}.
(8)
It is clear that (8) is satiafied if and only if there exista a vector a E 1R~f satisfying
qk - (xA)t `dk E {1,2,...,K},
ryj G (xA)ifx b'j E {1,2,...,J}.
Since T(w, A, X, Z) C Q, this concludes the proof.
This remilt, together with the example in section 3, shows that the no-arbitrage
structiue of equilibrium prices can indeed be violated as a result of constraints on the
trading of the contracts. Indeed, the example describes a market with one financial
asset whithout trading constraints and two reinsurance contracts where each of the two
risks was initially insured for 50oI'o by each of the two agenta. Therefore, there is the
constraint that each of the agents can at most buy 50010 of the reinsurance contract
(buying more would imply that they are overinsured). The example shows that there
exist equilibrium prices which allow for arbitrage posaibilities. This means that there
does not exist a vector ~r E IR~t of strictly positive state pricea such that q -~rA.
Therefore, we can conclude that the inequsïty ry G aR in theorem 5.3 can indeed be
strict.
6. Concluding remarks
The main isa~te in this paper was to show that if reinsurance markets are incomplete
and if the trade of reinsurance contracts is constrained by the prohibition of overinsur-
ance, then limited arbitrage possibilities may exist at equilibrium. As a result of this,
these equilibrium prices can not be concidered as being the discounted expected value of
the payoffs with respect to some probability measure on the state apace St. This implies
that, as opposed to Buhhnann's models, there may not exist equilibria if one restricts
to prices which are positive linear functionals.
Finally, I would like to remark that it is not essential that we restrict ourselves to
the reinaurance market. The resulta remain valid if one includes the insurance market.
It was only for notational convenience that we restricted to reinsurance.ls
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